Linda Pfannenstiehl vs. Curt Pfannenstiehl
August 4, 2016.
& Hines, JJ.1
Complaint for divorce filled in the Norfolk Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on Sept 22,2010.
The case was
by AngelaM. Ordoņez,
O'Regan for the husband.
Hirsch for the wife.
In this appeal from a judgment of divorce,
we are asked to determine whether the present value of
husband's beneficial interest in a discretionary
spendthrift trust (2004 trust) may be included in the
parties' divisible marital estate.
See G. L. c. 208, § 34, as amended by St. 2011, c. 124,
§§ 1, 2.
As part of the judgment of divorce in 2012, a judge in
the Probate and Family Court awarded Diane L.
Pfannenstiehl2 sixty per cent of her husband Curt F.
Pfannenstiehl's interest in the present value of the
2004 trust. At that time, the trust was valued at
$2,265,474.31. Curt appealed, arguing that the judge
abused her discretion by including the 2004 trust in the
marital estate. In a divided opinion, the Appeals Court
affirmed. See Pfannenstiehl v.
Pfannenstiehl, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 121, 124 (2015).
We granted Curt's application for further appellate
review, limited to issues concerning the 2004 trust.
We conclude that Curt's interest in the 2004 trust is
"so speculative as to constitute nothing more than [an]
expectanc[y]," and thus that it is "not assignable to
the marital estate." See Adams v. Adams, 459 Mass. 361,
S.C., 466 Mass. 1015 (2013). Although Curt's expectancy
of future acquisition of income from the 2004 trust is
not part of the marital estate, on remand, the judge,
pursuant to G. L.
c.208, § 34, may consider that expectancy as part of the
"opportunity of each [spouse] for future acquisition of
capital assets and income," in the judge's determination
of a revised equitable division of the marital
property.3 See Williams v.Massa, 431 Mass. 619, 629 (2000); Drapek v. Drapek, 399
Mass. 240, 245 (1987).
"We recite the facts from the judge's findings and the
uncontradicted evidence" in the record. Baccanti v.
Morton, 434 Mass. 787, 788 (2001).
Curt and Diane were married on February 5, 2000. They
have two children, a son and a daughter. Curt filed his
complaint for divorce on September 13, 2010. The parties
were married for twelve years, but had been separated
for nearly two years at the time of trial. Pursuant to
G. L. c. 208, § 48, the length of the marriage thus was
ten years and seven months. An amended divorce judgment
was entered on August 27, 2012. At that time, Curt was
forty-two years old and Diane was forty-eight years old;
each was in generally good health. Their son was then
eleven years old and their daughter
was eight years old.4 During the marriage, Curt was
employed primarily as an assistant bookstore manager for
a subsidiary of his father's
corporation, Educor, Inc.,5 earning approximately
$170,000 per year Curt's total annual income was
approximately $190,000 at the time of trial,
including his earnings at other part-time jobs.6
Prior to and during the first few years of the marriage,
Diane served in the United States Army Reserves, which
obligated her to participate in two weeks of training
twice per year. In 2004, Diane retired from the Army
Reserves, two years short of the twenty years of service
that would have entitled her to a pension. The judge
found that she made the decision to retire after
pressure from Curt and his family following the birth of
their daughter, who has Down syndrome. From 2004 through
the time of trial, Diane worked one day per week as an
ultrasound technician. At the time, Diane was earning a
gross annual income of $22,672. She also received $7,428
per year in rental income.7
During the marriage, the parties lived an upper middle
class lifestyle. They owned a home valued at in excess
$700,000, as well as other real estate,8 took several
vacations each year, and belonged to a country club.
The income to support this lifestyle was derived largely
from Curt's earnings, augmented by support from Curt's
father, as well as by distributions to Curt from the
2004 trust. The judge found that Diane made significant
contributions as a homemaker and caretaker of the
children, while also contributing her earnings and
rental income to the marital estate.
a.The 2004 trust.
The irrevocable trust at issue was established by Curt's
father in 2004, a few years after Curt and Diane
The trust benefits an open class of beneficiaries,10
composed of any one or more of the then living issue of
Curt's father. "Issue" is defined in the trust
as the "lawful blood descendants in the first, second,
or any other degree of" Curt's father. The 2004 trust is
funded through shares of two for-profit education
corporations, several life insurance policies, and a
cash account. The trustees are Curt's brother, who is
also a trust beneficiary, and a family attorney who is
not a beneficiary.
The 2004 trust provides that distributions to
beneficiaries may be made only with the approval of both
trustees, who "shall pay to, or apply for the
benefit of, a class composed of any one or more of the
Donor's then living issue such amounts of income and
principal as the Trustee,
in its sole discretion, may deem advisable from time to
time, whether in equal or unequal shares, to provide for
the comfortable support, health,
maintenance, welfare and education of each or all
members of such class."
The 2004 trust also contains a spendthrift provision,
pursuant to which "[n]either the principal nor income of
any trust created hereunder shall be subject to
alienation, pledge, assignment or other anticipation by
the person for whom the same is intended, nor to
attachment, execution, garnishment or other seizure
under any legal, equitable or other process."11
The judge found that, at the time of trial, there were
eleven living beneficiaries -- children and
grandchildren of Curt's father B- and no
great-grandchildren. The judge determined the total
present value of the 2004 trust to be
$24,920,217.37 at that time. Based on her finding that
Curt had a one-eleventh interest in the trust, she
determined the value of Curt's interest in the trust to
At that point, only Curt and his two siblings had
received any distributions from the 2004 trust; no
distributions had been made to any of the grandchildren.
Between 2004 and 2007, there were no distributions from
the trust. From April, 2008, until August, 2010, Curt
and his siblings received regular, tax-free
distributions from the trust.12 During that period, Curt
received regular monthly distributions for a total of
$800,000 in distributions. Since the complaint for
divorce was filed in September, 2010, Curt has not
received any distributions from the 2004 trust. The
judge found that the distributions to Curt ceased when
he filed the complaint for divorce because the trustees
deemed it too risky to distribute funds to Curt at a
time when he might be required to share the funds with
nonbeneficiary. The trustees continued to make
distributions to Curt's two siblings.
The judge determined that distributions from the 2004
trust "augmented" Curt and Diane's income and lifestyle
during the marriage. The judge concluded that Curt's
interest in the
2004 trust should be included as part of the marital
estate, and awarded sixty per cent of that estate to
Diane.13 The judge based the award on her findings
concerning Diane's "past, present and future
contributions and her lessened ability to acquire
capital assets and work full-time," which she contrasted
with Curt's "high salary, flexible work hours and
beneficiary status in his father's estate planning." To
effectuate the division of the 2004 trust, the judge
ordered Curt to pay Diane the sixty per cent of Curt's
interest that she had been awarded
in twenty-four monthly instalments of $48,699.77, for a
total payment of $1,168,794.41, which included a three
per cent interest rate.14
b.Equitable division of the marital estate.
General Laws c.208, § 34, vests broad authority in
judges of the Probate and Family Court to make equitable
division of the property included in the marital estate
of divorcing parties, taking into account
"the length of the marriage, the conduct of the parties
during the marriage, the age, health, station,
occupation, amount and sources of income,
vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities
and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of
each for future acquisition of capital assets and
income. . . . The court may also consider the
contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition,
preservation or appreciation in value of their
respective estates."See Rice v. Rice, 372 Mass. 398, 401
(1977); Bianco v Bianco 371 Mass. 420, 422 (1976).
Although a judge "has considerable discretion in
determining how to divide [marital] assets equitably,"
Baccantiv. Morton, 434 Mass. 787, 792 (2001),
the question we address here, whether an interest in a
trust is sufficiently similar to a property interest
that may be included in a marital estate
and thus subject to equitable division under G. L. c.
208, § 34, is a question of law. See Lauricella v.
Lauricella, 409 Mass. 211, 213 (1991).
General Laws c. 208, § 34, further provides that "the
court may assign to either husband or wife all or any
part of the estate of the other,
including but not limited to, all vested and nonvested
benefits, rights and funds accrued during the marriage
and which shall include, but not be limited to,
retirement benefits, pension, profit-sharing,
annuity, deferred compensation and insurance." A party's
estate for purposes of equitable
division under G. L. c. 208, § 34, "includes all
property to which a party holds title, however
acquired." Williams v. Massa, 431 Mass. 619, 625
(2000). In light of the plain language of G. L. c. 208,
§ 34, and the Legislature's explicit intent to grant
judges broad discretion to effectuate
an equitable distribution incident to divorce, we have
interpreted this provision to permit inclusion in the
marital estate of a broad range of property interests.
See Lauricella v. Lauricella, supra at 213-214. A
spouse's enforceable right to an asset generally permits
that asset to be included in the marital estate. See
Mahoney, 425 Mass. 441, 444 (1997) (dividing pension
plan but not Social Security benefits because employee
has "enforceable contractual right" to pension but not
to "governmental safety net" of Social Security
[citation omitted]); Hanify v. Hanify,
403 Mass. 184, 186-188 (1988) (enforceable right to
proceeds from successful lawsuit); Baccanti v. Morton,
right to delayed compensation from stock options).
Because we are not "bound by traditional concepts of
title or property" in considering whether a particular
interest is to be included in the marital estate, we
"have held a number of intangible interests (even those
not within the complete possession or control of their
holders) to be part of a spouse's estate for purposes of
[G. L. c. 208,] § 34." Baccanti v.
Morton, supra, quoting Lauricella v. Lauricella, supra
at 214. See, e.g., Adams v. Adams, 459 Mass. 361,
372-373 (2011);Davidson v. Davidson, 19 Mass. App. Ct.
364, 374-375 (1985);
Putnam v. Putnam, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 10, 17 (1977).
When interests are properly characterized as mere
expectancies, however, they may not be included in the
divisible estate of the divorcing parties.We have "drawn
a line around certain interests that are so speculative
as to constitute nothing more than expectancies, and
thus, are not assignable to the marital estate." Adams
v. Adams, supra at 374. Because
"[e]xpectancies . . . embody no enforceable rights
accruing during marriage," Hanify v. Hanify, supra at
188, they more
properly are characterized as "anticipated" but
"indefinite" opportunities for the future acquisition of
assets or income. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 425 Mass. 441,
444, 446 (1997). This is
because expectancies have "only theoretical value," and
do not create a fixed entitlement to income. Adams v.
at 376. See, e.g., Drapek v. Drapek, 399 Mass. 240, 244
(1987)(future earned income from professional degree);
Yannas v.Frondistou-Yannas, 395 Mass. 704, 714 (1985)
(anticipated futureincome from patents); Davidson v.
Davidson, 19 Mass. App. Ct. at
374 (husband's interest in inheritance from living
testator who could have altered will).
Whether a trust may be included in the divisible marital
estate requires close examination of the particular
trust instrument to determine whether the interest is a
"fixed and enforceable" property right, D.L. v. G.L., 61
Ct. 488, 499 (2004) (citation omitted), or "whether the
party's interest is too remote or speculative" to be
included. Id. at 496-497.
The question turns "on the attributes" of the specific
trust at issue, rather "than on principles of general
application," Lauricella v. Lauricella, supra at 216,
therefore requires evaluation of the facts and
circumstances of each case. See id. See also Williams v.
Massa, supra at 628-
629; S.L. v. R.L., 55 Mass. App. Ct. 880, 883-884
(2002); Ruml v. Ruml, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 500, 511-512
(2000). If an interest in a trust is determined after
such examination to be speculative or remote rather than
fixed and enforceable, and thus more properly
characterized as an expectancy, the interest is to be
considered under the G. L. c. 208, § 34, criterion of
"'opportunity of each [spouse] for future acquisition of
capital assets and income,' in determining what
disposition to make of he property that [i]s subject to division" [citation
omitted]. Williams v. Massa, supra at 629.c.
Curt's interest in the 2004 trust .Curt contends that
because the 2004 trust permits the trustees to
distribute funds to beneficiaries in their "sole
discretion," as they "may deem advisable from time to
time," he has no control over when and whether he
receives distributions, and, therefore, the 2004 trust
is a "discretionary" trust which creates "nothing more
than an eligibility for distributions."15 Curt contends
further that because the class of beneficiaries is open,
it was error for the judge to conclude that he had a
one-eleventh interest in the 2004 trust on the basis of
the then-living beneficiaries. In addition, he maintains
that, considering the trust instrument as a whole, see
Dana v. Gring, 374 Mass. 109, 117 (1977), and in
light of his father's intent, the 2004 trust may not be
used to benefit Diane. See Morse v. Kraft, 466 Mass. 92,
(when interpreting trust, intent of settlor is
paramount). Interests in discretionary trusts generally
are treated as expectancies and as too remote for
inclusion in a marital estate, because the interest is
not "present [and] enforceable";
the beneficiary must rely on the trustee's exercise of
discretion, does not have a present right to use the
trust principal, and cannot compel distributions. See
Lauricella, 409 Mass. 211, 216 (1991); Randolph v.
Roberts, 346 Mass. 578, 579 (1964). Diane attempts to
distinguish the 2004 trust from a "pure" discretionary
trust,16 however, by noting that distributions from the
2004 trust are subject to an "ascertainable standard"
which governs the trustee's discretion. See Dana v.
Gring, 374 Mass. 109, 116-117 (1977).
Under § 103 of the Uniform Trust Code, an "ascertainable
standard" refers to a trust provision that requires a
trustee to distribute funds to support a beneficiary's
needs "relating to an individual's health, education,
support or maintenance."17 See G. L. c. 203E, § 103.
This standard limits the discretion of the trustee, who
is obligated to make distributions with an eye toward
maintaining the beneficiary's standard of living in
existence at the time the trust was created.18 See Dana
Gring, supra, discussing Woodberry v. Bunker, 359 Mass.
The trustee of a trust that contains an ascertainable
standard must engage in a detailed inquiry into each
beneficiary's needs and finances, and must "give serious
and responsible consideration both as to the propriety
of the amounts and as to their consistency with the
terms and purposes of the trust." See Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Rodd, 356 Mass. 584,
588-589 (1970). Such consideration must be "viewed in
light of [the beneficiaries'] assets and needs, when
measured against the assets of the trust" (citation
omitted). Marsman v. Nasca, 30
Mass. App. Ct. 789, 796 (1991). See G. L. c. 203E, § 803
(if trust has more than one beneficiary, trustee must
give "due regard to the beneficiaries' respective
Diane argues that, because the trustees of the 2004
trust must take Curt's standard of living into account
when determining whether to make distributions, Curt has
a present enforceable property right to compel
distributions when he needs
them. Her argument relies in large part on the Appeals
Court's decision in Comins v. Comins, 33 Mass. App. Ct.
(1992), in which an interest in a discretionary trust
with an ascertainable standard was deemed sufficiently
certain to include the trust in the marital estate. In
that case, the wife was the sole beneficiary of the
trust. Id. at 30 n.4. She
received all of the trust income and held power of
appointment over the trust upon her death. Id.
Unlike the spouse in Comins, however, Curt is one of
eleven living beneficiaries among an open class of
beneficiaries. The trustees of the 2004 trust are
required to take into account the trust's long-term
needs and assets, unpredictability in the stocks that
fund it (which the judge found at times in the past have
provided no income or have incurred a loss), the
changing needs of the eleven current beneficiaries, and
the possibility of additional beneficiaries. Curt's
present right to distributions from the 2004 trust is
speculative, because the terms of the trust permit
unequal distributions among an open class that already
includes numerous beneficiaries, and because his right
"to receive anything is subject to the condition
precedent of the trustee having first exercised his
discretion" in determining the needs of an unknown
number of beneficiaries (citation omitted). See
Pemberton v. Pemberton, 9 Mass. App.
Ct. 9, 20 (1980). "[P]ower lodged in the trustee to
invade principal 'in its uncontrolled discretion' for
the maintenance, support and education of
[beneficiaries] does not give to the petitioners an
enforceable claim against the trust for their support."
Spalding v. Spalding, 356 Mass. 729, 729 (1969).
of the trust is subject to reduction in order to benefit
the needs of the remaining ten current beneficiaries, as
well as any future beneficiaries. Contrast S.L. v. R.L.,
55 Mass. App. Ct.
at 884 & n.10 (dividing wife's one-fifth interest in
trust with closed class of five beneficiaries because
death of beneficiary could increase wife's interest, but
her interest was not subject to reduction).19 The judge
found that distributions from the 2004 trust have not
been equal from year to year and from beneficiary to
beneficiary, with Curt receiving no distributions in
some years.20 In addition, although the existence of a
spendthrift provision alone does not bar equitable
division of a trust, see Lauricella v. Lauricella, supra
at 211-212, 216-217,
in light of the provisions in the 2004 trust, discussed
supra, an order dividing it to benefit Diane cannot
create a right in Curt to compel distributions in her
favor, when he does not otherwise have a right to compel
distributions. See Burrage v.
Bucknam, 301 Mass. 235, 236 (1938); Pemberton v.
Pemberton, 9 Mass. App. Ct. at 19-20.
Curt's remainder interest in the 2004 trust is equally
speculative. The 2004 trust benefits future generations,
and, consistent with their fiduciary obligations, the
trustees are unlikely to terminate the trust and
distribute the remainder of its principal in Curt's
lifetime. See Dana v. Gring, 374 Mass.
109, 117-118 (1977) (trustees must comply with "evident
intent to preserve trust principal for lineal
descendants" and, unless trust expressly states
otherwise, must administer trust with eye to future
generations); D.L. v. G.L., 61 Mass. App. Ct. 488, 497
(2004) (considering generational nature of trust in
concluding interest in trust remainder was too remote
for inclusion in marital estate).
The judge found that termination of the 2004 trust, and
distribution of its remaining principal, would be
contingent on the trust no longer holding any stock in
one of the for-profit higher education corporations that
fund it. The judge found also that the trustees do not
intend to sell those shares, and that Curt does not have
the ability to compel them to do so. Therefore, the
possibility that the 2004 trust will be terminated and
the principal distributed to the remainder
beneficiaries is remote.21 Cf. Lauricella v. Lauricella,
supra at 212, 216 n.6; S.L. v. R.L., 55 Mass. App. Ct.
880, 884 & n.10(2002).
Considering the language of the 2004 trust, and the
particular circumstances here, the ascertainable
standard does not render Curt's future acquisition of
assets from the trust sufficiently certain such that it
may be included in the marital estate under G. L. c.
208, § 34. Cf. Lauricella v. Lauricella,
supra at 216; Williams v. Massa, 431 Mass. at 628-629.
As noted, however, the trust may be considered as an
expectancy of future "'acquisition of capital assets and
income' in determining what disposition to make of the
property that [i]s subject to division."22 See Williams
v. Massa, supra at 629,
quoting G. L. c. 208, § 34; Drapek v. Drapek, 399 Mass.
240, 245 (1987).
The order dividing Curt's interest in the 2004 trust is
vacated and set aside.
The matter is remanded to the Probate and Family Court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1 Justice Duffly participated in the deliberation on
this case and authored this opinion prior to her
2 Because the parties share the same last name, we refer
to Curt F. Pfannenstiehl and Diane L. Pfannenstiehl by
their first names.
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by Martha
R. Bagley and William H. Schmidt.
4 The judge awarded shared legal custody of the children
to both parents, and primary physical custody to Diane.
The judge incorporated in the judgment of divorce the
parties' stipulation as to the amount of child support
Curt was to pay Diane.
5 The corporation manages a number of for-profit
institutions of higher education in Massachusetts and
Indiana. The parties suggest that Curt has continued to
be employed in the same capacity in his father's
corporation since the divorce.
6 Curt also worked part time as an on-call fire fighter,
and occasionally as a snow plow driver for the town of
Dover and for private clients.
7 The rental income was from a two-family house held in
Diane's name alone.
8 The judge found that the total value of the parties'
marital estate, which included real estate, bank
accounts, retirement accounts, insurance proceeds,
deferred compensation, and personal property, was
$4,305,379.28. The parties stipulated to the value of
the real estate, and, by the time of trial, had divided
the majority of the assets other than the 2004 trust,
the valuation and division of which were the key issues
9 The 2004 trust provides that it is governed in
accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth.
10 An open class of beneficiaries is one in which the
interests of currently living beneficiaries are subject
to partial reduction in favor of persons born after the
creation of the trust who, under its terms, are entitled
to share as members. See H.S. Shapo, G.G. Bogert, & G.T.
Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 182, at 404 (3rd ed.
11 A spendthrift provision has the effect of prohibiting
a creditor or assignee from reaching a beneficiary's
interest in a trust, unless the beneficiary receives
such distribution and the creditor then pursues a claim
against the beneficiary individually. G. L. c. 203E, §
502 (c). See Pemberton v. Pemberton, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 9,
19-20 (1980); Newman, Spendthrift and Discretionary
Trusts: Alive and Well Under the Uniform Trust Code, 40
Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 567, 569 (2005). In the
absence of a spendthrift provision, a "court may
authorize a creditor or assignee of the beneficiary to
reach the beneficiary's interest by attachment of
present or future distributions . . . or other means."
G. L. c. 203E, § 501.
12 Under the terms of the 2004 trust, distributions are
not taxable to the beneficiaries, because Curt's father
is responsible for taxes on any income earned by the
13 The judge decided that, because Curt's "share of the
2004 Trust is being divided," the judge would "not use
any future stream of income from distributions in
assessing alimony," and ordered that "[n]either party is
awarded alimony at this time." Because we conclude that
the 2004 trust should not have been included in the
divisible marital estate, it may be appropriate on
remand for the judge and the parties to revisit whether
alimony is now appropriate, and, if so, in what amount,
on the basis of the factors the judge may deem relevant
G. L. c. 208, § 53 (a).
14 Although Curt initially complied with the order
obligating him to make these payments, in January, 2013,
Diane filed a complaint for contempt, asserting that
Curt had that month stopped making the required
payments. See Pfannenstiehl
v. Pfannenstiehl, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 121, 135 (2015).
hearing, Curt was adjudicated in contempt. Id. at 136.
Concluding that Curt "at least ostensibly tried" to
obtain funds from the trust to make the payments to
Diane, but that the trustees refused to distribute the
funds, the Appeals Court set aside the judgment of
contempt, see id., commenting that Curt had not "wilfully
and intentionally violated a clear and unequivocal
order." Although the judgment of contempt is not before
us in this limited grant of further appellate review,
based on our conclusion that the 2004 trust should not
have been included in the marital estate, we would agree
that the judgment of contempt must be set aside.
15 "A discretionary trust is one in which the settlor
gives the trustee authority over the trust . . .
[including the authority] to use discretion in the
timing and amount of income payments to the
beneficiary." H.S. Shapo, G.G. Bogert, & G.T. Bogert,
Trusts and Trustees § 228. See Restatement (Second) of
Trusts § 155 (1959).
16 "Pure" discretionary trusts permit a trustee's
"sole," "uncontrolled," or otherwise unlimited exercise
of discretion, and do not provide a governing standard
for trust distributions.
H.S. Shapo, G.G. Bogert, & G.T. Bogert, Trusts and
§ 228. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 155(1)
(1959); Amann, 6 Est. Plan. & Community Prop. L.J. 181,
17 General Laws c. 203E, § 814 (b) (1), provides that,
unless otherwise indicated, the "ascertainable standard"
is incorporated into the distribution provisions of
every trust governed by Massachusetts law.
18 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) also uses the term
"ascertainable standard" in the context of trusts and
estates. Under IRS regulations, a beneficiary's interest
in a trust is included in that beneficiary's taxable
estate if the beneficiary has a general power of
appointment through which he or she controls the
distribution of the trust principal, but is excluded
from the taxable estate if the discretion to distribute
trust principal is limited by an "ascertainable standard
relating to health, education, support, or maintenance."
U.S.C. § 2041(a)(2), (b)(1)(A). See Dana v. Gring, 374
Mass. 109, 110-111 (1977); Woodberry v. Bunker, 359
Mass. 239, 240
19 "Unlike alimony, a property settlement is not subject
to modification." Drapek v. Drapek, 399 Mass. 240, 244
(1987). Thus, Curt would be unable to modify a property
division that included the value of his interest in the
2004 trust even if future beneficiaries or events reduce
that interest. See id.
20 As noted, Curt received distributions from the trust,
which was established in 2004, only during the period
from April, 2008, through August, 2010.
21 Under its terms, if the 2004 trust were to be
terminated, the principal would be distributed to Curt
and any of his siblings over the age of thirty, or, if
any sibling were deceased at the time of termination,
held in trust until the children of that sibling reach
the age of thirty.
22 See notes 8 and 13, supra.
Download Case in PDF