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NISSENBAUM’S STANDARD SET OF
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
209A Soup to Nuts
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12.0 Destruction of Records if Order is Vacated
C. 209A, Section 7 provides that whenever an abuse prevention order is vacated, the court shall direct the appropriate law enforcement agency to destroy all record of the vacated order. See Smith v. Joyce, 421 Mass. 520, 521 (1995). Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637 (1998).
The order does not need to be vacated nunc pro tunc, see Santos v. Chrysler Corp., 430 Mass. 198, 216 (1999), because the registry created by G. L. c. 209A, § 7 includes specific measures to ensure that the record of a vacated restraining or protective order will be eliminated, thereby obviating the possibility of public disclosure or possible service of a vacated order. Vaccaro v. Vaccaro, 425 Mass. 153, 157-159, 161-162 (1997). Uttaro v. Uttaro, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 871 (2002).
The § 7 mechanisms are sufficient safeguards, without the court’s intrusion into the legislative thicket entering a nunc pro tunc order. Uttaro v. Uttaro, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 871 (2002).
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