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**Vaughan Parents' Petition to the Supreme Judicial  
Court**

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS  
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

SUFFOLK, SS.

\* \* \* \* \*  
SAMUEL AND JOAN R. VAUGHAN,  
Plaintiff,  
v.  
ELIZABETH VAUGHAN,  
Defendant.  
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Civil Action No. \_\_\_\_\_

PETITION TO INVOKE THE GENERAL  
SUPERINTENDENCE OF THE COURT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. This is an action to invoke the general superintendence of this Court to correct errors of law in the proceedings of the Probate and Family Court, Essex County, and the Single Justice of the Appeals Court, (Brown, J). Plaintiff seeks to prevent disclosure of their financial net worth, estate plans and wills in a divorce action involving their son, as ordered by the Essex Probate Court and the Single Justice of the Appeals Court.

JURISDICTION

2. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, § 3.

PARTIES

3. Plaintiffs Samuel and Joan R. Vaughan are the natural parents of Allan Vaughan, plaintiff in the underlying divorce action. They reside in Prides Crossing, Massachusetts.

4. Defendant Elizabeth Vaughan, wife to Allan Vaughan, is the defendant in the underlying divorce action. She, too, resides in Prides Crossing, Massachusetts.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

5. Elizabeth Vaughan seeks to inquire into the net worth, estate plans and wills of Samuel and Joan R. Vaughan to determine the property division in the underlying divorce action. She asserts that this financial information reflects her husband's "opportunity for ... future acquisition of capital assets and income," which is a factor in property division, pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 208, § 34.

6. The Vaughans agreed to disclose all vested interests belonging to Allan but should not be required to reveal other confidential financial and estate information (consisting solely of expectancy rather than vested rights) unrelated to Allan's interest. Generally, expectancy rights, embody no enforceable rights and cannot be factored into a property division. See Hanify v. Hanify, 403 Mass. 184, 188 (1988).

7. On September 26, 1991, the Vaughans moved for a protective order in the Probate Court seeking to prevent defendant from taking their depositions and requiring them to disclose highly private and confidential information. That motion was denied on October 3, 1991 (Harms, J.). A Petition For Relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 118(1), filed on October 17, 1991, was denied by the Single Justice of the Appeals Court (Brown, J.), on October 23, 1991, without opinion.

refused to divulge their other estate plans. As a consequence of the depositions, scheduled for October 16, 1991, the parents moved, on September 26, 1991, for a protective order to prevent such intrusive discovery of confidential matters. On October 3, 1991, Justice Harms of the Essex Probate Court in an abbreviated Memorandum denied the protective order. The parents now file this appeal to reverse that Order and enter a protective order preventing disclosure of their sensitive and confidential estate plans and financial matters.

III. ARGUMENT

A. This Appeal is properly before the Single Justice

Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 231, §118, paragraph 1, allows a party "aggrieved by an interlocutory order of a trial court justice in . . . the probate or family court department [to] file, within thirty days of the entry of such order, a petition in the appropriate appellate court seeking relief from such order." The single justice must examine the Probate Court's action for an abuse of discretion, Hanify, supra, 403 Mass. at 191, and may, in its discretion, vacate, suspend or modify the order and enter such further orders as the single justice deems appropriate. Packaging Indus. Group v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 609, 614 (1980); Wangson, supra, 478 N.E.2d at 1272; see also Edwin R. Sage Co. v. Foley, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 20, 25 (1981).

This matter falls squarely within the province of the powers of the single justice. Justice Harms of the Essex Probate Court abuse her discretion by denying the petitioners'

motion for a protective order. The matter is scheduled for trial on October 24 and 25, 1991 and the instant depositions are planned for October 16, 1991 requiring immediate review. Justice Harms has continued this action until disposition of this appeal.

B. Non-vested expectancy rights do not constitute title in property and cannot factor into an alimony award

The Probate Court committed error by assuming that Allan Vaughan's non-vested expectancy rights appropriately factor into an award of alimony. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 208, §34 lists several factors which a court must consider when determining a property division, including: "amount and sources of income . . . estate . . . liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income." M.G.L.A ch. 208, §34, West Suppl. 1990. It is well settled that a party's "estate includes property to which he holds title, however acquired." Rice, 361 N.E.2d 1305, 1307; Hanify, 403 Mass. at 187; Davidson, 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 369-370; Drapek v. Drapek, 399 Mass. 240, 503 N.E.2d 946, 948 (1987). Massachusetts courts have agreed that inheritance may play a decisive role in the division of property. See Earle v. Earle, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 1062, 1063 (1982); Frederick v. Frederick, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 329, 334 (1990) (likelihood of substantial inheritance played role in alimony award); Davidson v. Davidson, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 374-75 (1985). "Inheritance," however, includes vested rights;

courts have declined to apply non-vested expectancy rights to property division determination.

In Davidson, for example, the court factored into the alimony award the husband's interest in a unfunded trust, even though the trust might never be funded. Id. at 371-72. Even though ambiguous in monetary terms, the husband possessed a vested interest in the trust as the life income beneficiary. Id. at 366. His vested rights supplied a sufficient property interest to influence the alimony award. Id.

Conversely, the husband's non-vested inheritance was too tenuous to enter the analysis. The court reasoned that unlike the vested trust rights which were clearly established, expectancy rights required an examination of collateral issues, such as "the validity of the will, current and future testamentary capacity, the valuation of the estates of others, familial relationships, and so forth." Id. at 374. Though a court might consider these collateral issues, evidentiary constraints "deflect secondary considerations." Id.

The Supreme Judicial Court, in dictum, supports this rejection of expectancy rights in property division. In Hanify v. Hanify, 403 Mass. at 188, the court allowed a prospective award of money damages to influence the division of property. There, the husband was awaiting results of pending employment litigation. The trial court factored his impending money damages into its division of property. Id. at 186-87. The court upheld this action by the trial judge. The husband's

impending lawsuit constituted a "chose in action" and therefore qualified as the husband's property. Id. at 187. His claim was "enforceable, ripened and pending" and therefore was an appropriate factor in determining property division. Id. at 188.

The Court, however, distinguished prospective money damages from expectancy interests which "embody no enforceable rights accruing during marriage." Id. at 188, citing Drapek v. Drapek, 399 Mass. 240, 244 (1987); Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 395 Mass. 704, 714 (1985) and Davidson, 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 374; see also Lauricella v. Lauricella, 409 Mass. 211 (1991) (beneficial interest in trust unlike a mere expectancy which court has held to lie outside of estate). Judge Liacos, in his concurring opinion, further rejected application of expectancy rights where "at the time of the divorce, the testator was still alive and could have changed the inheritance provisions." Id. at 192; Davidson, supra, 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 374.

Here, Allan has no right to the net worth or assets of his parents, who have attested that no vested interests inure to Allan. Moreover, as living testators, they may alter their estate plans, requiring further changes in alimony if the award is based on testamentary interests. All of these considerations, together with the reasoning of the Supreme Judicial Court in Hanify, support exclusion of expectancy rights from the property division.

C. The Court abused its discretion in failing to balance interests in this discovery dispute as required by law.

Samuel and Joan Vaughan relied upon the protections of Mass. R. Civ P. 26(c) to prevent their "annoyance, oppression and embarrassment." That rule requires a court to examine all of the attendant circumstances in deciding whether to allow additional discovery. The Probate Court must balance the parents' interest in preserving their confidentiality and avoiding annoyance, embarrassment and oppression, with Elizabeth Vaughan's need for the additional information. See Wangson, supra, 478 N.E.2d at 1272. After balancing these factors, the Court exercises its discretion in granting or denying the protective order. Id. On appeal, this Court reviews the order for an abuse of discretion. Id. Any failure by the trial judge to apply the proper legal standard constitutes an abuse of discretion. Edwin R. Sage, supra, 12 Mass. App. Ct. at 25.

On its face, the Order lacks any attention to the Rule 26(c) factors. Nowhere does the court analyze the attendant circumstances nor perform the required balancing of interests. While recognizing "that an exhaustive deposition and document request might be overkill," the court neglects to balance the parents' interests against Elizabeth Vaughan's. Having failed to perform its duty, the Probate Court abused its discretion in denying the protective order. The Order ignores the required legal standards, both for protective orders and for property division and should be reversed.



IV. CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, Samuel and Joan R. Vaughan request that the Single Justice:

- (1) Vacate the Order of the Essex Probate Court denying the protective order;
- (2) Enter an Order preventing disclosure of the parents net worth, assets and estate plans; and
- (3) For such further orders or relief as deemed proper.

SAMUEL AND JOAN R. VAUGHAN

By their attorneys,



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
Dated: October 17, 1991

WP-8166/V  
10/16/91

Certificate of Service

I, Yvette C. Mendez, attorney for Samuel and Joan Revell Vaughan, hereby certify that on October 17, 1991, I served the foregoing Petition for Relief Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 231, §118, Para. 1, Brief of Samuel and Joan R. Vaughan in Support of the Petition for Relief Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 231, §118, Para. 1; and Proposed Order of the Court, upon defendant Elizabeth Vaughan by mailing a copy of same by first class mail, postage prepaid, to her counsel, Nancy R. Van Tine, Esq., Burns & Levinson, 125 Summer Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02110.

Signed under the penalties of perjury.

  
Yvette C. Mendez

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